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The Fact of a Prior Conviction Does Not Have to Be
Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt to a Jury to
Lengthen a Sentence Beyond the Statutory
Maximum: Commonwealth v. Aponte
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT
- SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS - PRIOR CONVICTIONS The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a statute doubling
the statutory maximum penalty upon proof of prior conviction for
a similar offense, without requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt before a jury, did not violate defendant's due process rights.
Commonwealth v. Aponte, 855 A.2d 800 (Pa.2004).
Melvin Aponte was tried in absentia and found guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance ("PWID") and
conspiracy after failing to appear for trial.' The presentence investigator received background information on Aponte from a
number of different sources.2 In the presentence report, it was
asserted that Aponte had two prior convictions.3 Because Aponte
had two prior convictions for the same or similar offenses, the trial
court sentenced him to twice the statutory maximum for both convictions (PWID and conspiracy).4 In affirming the trial court's
sentence for the PWID conviction, the superior court relied on Apprendi v. New Jersey.' Having found that title 35, section 780115(a) of the Pennsylvania Statutes is inapplicable to underlying

1. Commonwealth v. Aponte, 855 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. 2004). Melvin Aponte was arrested in Philadelphia on July 12, 1999 while in possession of cocaine. Brief for Appellant
at 4, Aponte (No. 21EAP2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. Aponte had been convicted in Connecticut in 1994 for Felony Drugs and in
Philadelphia in 1997 for Felony Drugs. Id. (citing Pre-Sentence Report, 6/13/01, at 1).
4. Id. The applicable sentencing enhancement provides that a person convicted of a
"second or subsequent offense .. .or of a similar offense under any statute of the United
States or of any state, may be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized, fined an amount up to twice that otherwise authorized, or both." 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §
780-115(a) (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 802. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which provides that
the government is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial a defendant's
prior convictions.
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inchoate crimes, the superior court vacated and remanded the increased conspiracy sentence.6
Justice Eakin wrote the majority opinion of the court.! The first
issue submitted to this court by appellant was whether section
780-115(a) is a violation of constitutional due process because
prior convictions, as elements leading to an increased sentence, do
not have to be proven in front of a jury.8
In their analysis, the majority first acknowledged that legislative enactments are strongly presumed constitutional, and thus
there is a heavy burden when they are challenged.9 The court
then set forth the standard for determining whether a statute is
constitutional. 10
Justice Eakin first addressed Aponte's claims of violations of his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under section 780-115.1

In addressing Aponte's first argument, the court looked to the Supreme Court case of Apprendi v. New Jersey.12 In Apprendi, the
Supreme Court of the United States held in significant part that
the fact of a prior conviction need not be presented to a jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 3
The majority opinion next proceeded into an historical analysis
of relevant cases.' The court wrote that, prior to Apprendi, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that a statute that pro6. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 802.
7. Id. The majority included Justices Eakin, Cappy, Nigro, and Newman in full. Id.
at 802. Justice Castille joined as to all but footnote one and Justice Saylor joined in all but
the majority's analysis of the Pennsylvania constitutional claim. Id. at 812. Former Chief
Justice Zappala did not participate in the decision of this case. Id.
8. Id. at 803.
9. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1996)).
10. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 803. The statute is constitutional "unless it clearly, palpably,
and plainly violates the Constitution; all doubts are to be resolved in favor of a finding of
constitutionality." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Hendrickson, 724 A.2d 315, 317 (Pa.
1999)).
11. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 803.
12. Id. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which holds that:
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, require: Other than the fact of a priorconviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt... 'It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed
range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that
such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999))
(emphasis added).
13. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 804.
14. Id.

Spring 2005

Commonwealth v. Aponte

467

vided a mandatory minimum sentence was not unconstitutional
because it did not elevate the maximum sentence, but merely es5 Justice Eakin then distablished a requisite minimum penalty."
cussed how the Supreme Court had further dealt with the differences between "sentencing factors" and "elements."16 The court
then reasserted the general rule from Apprendi17 and discussed its
rationale.18
The majority next addressed Aponte's argument that the prior
conviction exception had been retracted by the Supreme Court,
and that prior convictions must now be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 The Court rejected this argument because the case
Aponte cited in support of his argument was factually different,
and did not address the prior conviction exception."
Justice Eakin's opinion next dealt with Aponte's claim that the
statute violated Article I, sections 6 and 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.2 The court asserted the general proposition that a
state may give its citizens more rights and protections than those
provided for by the federal constitution.22
The majority noted that Aponte argued that at common law
there existed a right to have a jury try cases in which a sentence
15. Id. (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1982)).
16. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 804-05 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998)). The Court in Almendarez-Torres held that a statute which increased a maximum sentence if the defendant had prior convictions was not an "element" of the offense,
but merely a "sentencing factor." Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27.
17. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 805. "[Any fact which increases the maximum penalty must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However... prior convictions
[are] an exception to this requirement." Id.
18. Id. at 805. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Apprendi was that prior convictions
had already been held to the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard at a prior trial, while
any other fact admitted without submission to a jury would be subjected to a lesser standard of proof. Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496).
19. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 806. Aponte's argument stems from the Court's decision in
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Id. In Ring, the Court neglected to include the prior
conviction exception in its recitation of the rule from Apprendi. Id. at 806.
20. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 806. The majority concluded that "[no aggravating circumstance related to past convictions in his case; Ring therefore does not challenge Almendarez-Torres ..
, which held that the fact of prior conviction may be found by the judge
even if it increases the statutory maximum sentence." Id. (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 597
n.4).
21. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 806. Pa. Const. art. I, §6. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[tirial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." Id.
The Pennsylvania Constitution also provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused
hath a right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage... nor can he be
deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land." Id. at §9.
22. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 806-07 (citing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa.
1991)).
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could be enhanced because of prior convictions, and it is, therefore,
a right provided for in sections 6 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 3 The court then addressed the decisions cited by Aponte
that held that prior convictions must be pled in the indictment;
the fact that a defendant was the one previously convicted; and
the defendant must have notice of the potentially extended sentence, and must have an opportunity to be heard.24
The court specifically discussed Aponte's use of Commonwealth
v. Reagan.22 Justice Eakin argued that Aponte did not appropriately address the rationale in Reagan." The majority reasoned
that, at common law, there was a broader definition of what an
"element" to an offense was because the sentences for every crime
were prescribed by the offenses. 27 Thus, the court held that the
times have changed, and that the statutory scheme prevails over
the common law."
Justice Eakin next addressed the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruling in the case of Commonwealth v. Griffin." The court
in Griffin held in significant part that the statutes did not create a
new offense or element to the crime of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver." Applying the rationale from
Griffin, the majority held that Aponte's historical argument failed.
31

The court next evaluated the decisions of other jurisdictions
which decided the question of prior conviction sentence enhancements.2 Justice Eakin cited a multitude of cases from various ju23. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 807.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 808. See Commonwealth v. Reagan, 502 A.2d 702 (Pa. 1985), where the court
held that prior driving under the influence (DUI) convictions did not need to be pled in the
information because they were not an element of the crime of DUI. Aponte distinguished
Reagan from the other cases he relied upon because Reagan involved the implementation of
a mandatory minimum sentence as opposed to an increased maximum sentence. Aponte,
855 A.2d at 808.
26. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 808.
27. Id. See U.S. v. Gray, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
28. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 808.
29. Id. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super. Ct. 2002), in which Griffin
was convicted under the same statute for which Aponte was convicted, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §
780-113(a)(30). Id. at 15.
30. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 808-09.
31. Id. at 809. The court held specifically, that "the offense of possession with intent to
deliver is completely and exclusively defined in §780-113(a)(30); the recidivist provision of
§780-115(a) is a sentence enhancement, separate from the elements of possession with
intent to deliver, and it does not transpose prior convictions for that offense into a substantive element of§ 780-113(a)(30)." Id.
32. Id.
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risdictions which supported the majority's holding that the prior
conviction exception from Apprendi still applies, thus making it
unnecessary
to submit evidence of such prior convictions to the
33
jury.
Aponte's final argument was that cases dealing with the elevation of a maximum sentence are treated differently by this court
than cases for which a minimum sentence is prescribed in situations of recidivism.3 4 Aponte's argument relied on the fact that the
supreme court has held in the past that prior convictions, as sentencing factors, were not elements of a crime." The court wrote
that Aponte's argument was flawed in that it failed to realize that
the statute at issue was distinguishable from those cited because
it requires no findings of fact, but rather, it simply requires the
application of an historical fact.36
The majority thus held that the prior conviction exception in the
Apprendi rule was constitutionally valid and reasserted the general rules from Apprendi.37 Applying those rules, the court held
that because the prior conviction exception was valid, it was unnecessary for Aponte's past convictions to be submitted to the
jury.38 Therefore, the court concluded that Aponte's sentence was
correctly enhanced under section 780-115(a), and thus affirmed
his sentence.
Justice Castille concurred in the judgment and joined in the majority opinion as to all but footnote one.4" Justice Castille agreed
with the majority's ultimate conclusions, but believed the majority's grounds were too broad for deciding whether Aponte's failure
to raise a constitutional challenge of the sentencing statute before
the trial court was the equivalent of a waiver of such a challenge.41
Justice Castille raised two factors which complicated the issue of
whether Aponte's claim, questioning the constitutionality of the
statute under which his sentence was enhanced, was automatically reviewable under Pennsylvania's "illegal sentence" doctrine.4 '
33. Id. at 809-10.
34. Id. at 810-11.
35. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 810 (citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354 (Pa. 1985)
and Commonwealth v. Allen, 494 A.2d 1067 (Pa. 1985)).
36. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 811.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 812.
39. Id.
40. Id. (Castille, J., concurring).
41. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 812 (Castille, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 813-14 (Castille, J., concurring).
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First, Justice Castille expressed his reservations with using a
relaxed waiver form in situations where, if the statute at issue
were held invalid, only then would the sentence exceed the statutory maximum.4 '3 Next, Justice Castille made the distinction between a sentence's legality where the sentence falls within the
statute, and those that exceed any possible statutory sentence."
In this case, Justice Castille argued, Aponte's sentence fell within
the prescribed statutory limits; thus, the statute itself was at issue, not the sentence, and constitutional challenges should not
then be held automatically unwaivable.4 5
Justice Castille's basic argument was that the question of
whether a defendant's claim that his sentence is illegal is automatically reviewable, despite an apparent waiver, has not been
clearly decided, it is within the court's discretion to hear the
claim. 6 Justice Castille thus held that, although he does not believe Aponte's claim was reviewable, it was within the discretion
of the court to hear the claim on the merits.4 7 He therefore joined
the majority in its judgment. 8
Justice Saylor concurred in the judgment and the federal claim
analysis of the majority, but did not agree with the majority's
analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitutional claim.49 First, Justice
Saylor argued that the majority opinion improperly implied that
similar prior convictions are undisputed facts, not required to be
proven on the record." Rather than looking to the relative labeling and statutory placement of the underlying offense as the majority did to determine whether a state constitutional right exists
to have a factor submitted before a jury, Justice Saylor argued
that the nature of the element of the offense should be considered. 1
Justice Saylor agreed with the majority's finding that a previous
conviction is distinguishable from an offense element in that it
does not pertain to the crime, but rather to a prior proceeding in
43. Id. at 813 (Castille, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 814 (Castille J., concurring).
45. Id. (Castille, J., concurring).
46. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 815-16 (Castille, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 816 (Castille, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 816 (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Saylor references his dissent in Commonwealth v. Wynn, 786 A.2d 202 (Pa. 2001), in which he asserted his concerns with the
issue of waiver. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 816 (Saylor, J., concurring).
50. Aponte, 855 A.2d at 817 (Saylor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 818 (Saylor, J., concurring).
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which a jury found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.52 Therefore, Justice Saylor joined the majority opinion in
full, except for the state constitutional analysis.53
The narrow legal issue in this case was whether a statute is a
violation of due process under the Pennsylvania and United States
Constitutions when it doubles the statutory maximum sentence
for a recidivist crime without a requirement that the prior conviction(s) be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury."
This specific issue of sentencing adjustments has been repeatedly addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.5 5 The
Court's first encounter with the issue occurred in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, decided in 1986.5" The main issue in McMillan was
whether a state statute was constitutional when it provided a
mandatory minimum sentence for anyone convicted of an enumerated felony where "the sentencing judge finds, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the person 'visibly possessed a firearm' during the commission of the offense."57 The Court relied upon the
principle from Pattersonv. New York"s that in deciding which factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the statutory
definitions of what constitutes an element of an offense is normally dispositive."9
The petitioners argued that the fact of visible possession of a
firearm must be submitted before a jury and proven beyond a rea-

52. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Saylor thus agrees with the "outcome reached
by the majority, namely, that the challenged sentence enhancement does not implicate the
right to a trial by a jury as guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 802. The effect of Pennsylvania drug sentencing law is to punish repeat
offenders up to twice the maximum sentence as first-time offenders. The act provides that
Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under clause (30) of subsection (a)
of section 13 of this act or of a similar offense under any statute of the United States or of
any state, may be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term otherwise authorized, fined
an amount up to twice that otherwise authorized, or both.
The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §780-115(a
55. Derrick Bingham, The Meaning of Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights: Sentencing
in FederalDrug Cases after Apprendi v. New Jersey and Harris v. United States, 20 GA. ST.
U. L.REV. 723, 723-64 (2004) (discussing the history of sentencing adjustment cases and the
changes that have and will result from the Apprendi decision).
56. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
57. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81 (quoting The Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. §9712 (1982)). McMillan was decided by a five to four decision, with Justice Rehnquist delivering the majority opinion, Justice Marshall filing a dissenting opinion, with whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined, and Justice Stevens
filing a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 81, 93, 95.
58. 432 U.S. 197(1977).
59. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85.
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sonable doubt. 6' The Court ruled that the Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act does not elevate the maximum sentence for the
crime and does not create a separate offense.6 ' The Court concluded that the fact of visible possession of a firearm was merely a
sentencing factor, and not an element of an offense, thus it was
not subject to a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.62
In 1998, the Supreme Court of the United States again considered the validity of a statute that provided for a sentence adjustment without presenting the factor in question to the jury." In
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the defendant was convicted
of being in the United States illegally after having been deported
for felony convictions.64 The issue in the case was whether 8
U.S.C. §1326(b)(2) defines a separate crime or merely authorizes
an elevated sentence."
In its analysis, the Court first looked to the apparent intent of
Congress.66 The Court ruled that Congress did not intend to create a separate criminal offense, but rather that it merely created a
sentencing factor.67 The Court also discussed the difference between a statute that provides a mandatory minimum sentence,
and one that provides a 'permissive maximum' sentence." Comparing Almendarez to McMillan, the Court found that while the
McMillan case addressed a statute providing a mandatory minimum sentence, the statute at issue in Almendarez was not signifi-

60. Id. at 84.
61. Id. at 87-88.
62. Id. at 89-90.
63. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
64. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
65. Id. at 226. When an illegal alien is deported for an aggravated felony and returns
to the United States illegally, his maximum sentence is twenty years, rather than the two
year maximum sentence for returning aliens who were initially deported for something
other than an aggravated felony. Title 8 U.S.C. §1326(a) makes it a crime for a deported
alien to return to the United States without special permission and authorizes a maximum
prison term of two years. In 1988, Congress added subsection (b)(2), which authorizes a
maximum prison term of 20 years for "any alien described in subsection (a), if the initial
deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." Id. at
224.
66. Id. at 228. When interpreting Congress' intent, the Court looked to "the statute's
language, structure, subject matter, context, and history-factors that typically help courts
determine a statute's objectives and thereby illuminate its text." Id.
67. Id. at 235.
68. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244.
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or normally,
cantly different because it did not "systematically,
6 9
defendant.
criminal
a
of
disadvantage
the
to
work
The Court thus held that the statute did not create a new offense that had to be included in the indictment or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, but rather that the statute merely created a
sentencing factor.70
In 1999, the Supreme Court of the United States again addressed a case involving a statute that prescribed an adjusted sentence upon the occurrence of additional facts.71 The issue before
the Court in Jones v. United States was "whether the federal carjacking statute... defined three distinct offenses or a single crime
with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent
on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and
jury verdict."72 Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. 3
The Court held that the statute created additional elements of
an offense when it provided for higher penalties to be imposed for
offenses resulting in a serious bodily injury or death." In significant part, the Court addressed its general holding in Almendarez,
that not all facts which increase the maximum penalty allowed
are required to be charged in an indictment."5 The Court distinguished Almendarez on the basis that it did not apply broadly to
all factors that elevate maximum sentences, but rather, it applied

69. Id. The Court summarized this point by stating that "the risk of unfairness to a
particular defendant is no less, and may well be greater, when a mandatory minimum
sentence, rather than a permissive sentence, is at issue." Id. at 245.
70. Id. at 247-48.
71. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). In Jones, the defendant was convicted
of 'using or aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §942(c), and caijacking or aiding and abetting carjacking."
Id. at 230.
72. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. 18 U.S.C. §2118 established the following maximum penalties,
[wihich at the time provided... that a person possessing a firearm who 'takes a motor vehicle ... from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation... shall-(1) be... imprisoned not more than 15 years . . . , (2) if serious
bodily injury ... results, be ... imprisoned not more than 25 years... , and (3) if
death results, be... imprisoned for any number of years up to life... '
Id. at 227 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §2119 (1994)).
73. Id. at 229. In this five to four decision, Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Justice Souter in the majority. Id. Justices Stevens and Thomas filed concurring opinions. Id. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor and Breyer joined. Id.
74. Id. at 251-52.
75. Id. at 248.
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narrowly to the fact of a prior conviction.76 In finding that the
statute created three separate offenses with distinct elements, the
Court found that the aggravating facts of serious bodily injury or
death were in fact elements of the offense, and not merely sentencing factors.77
In 2000, The Supreme Court of the United States decided the
landmark case of Apprendi v. New Jersey.' The issue in Apprendi
was whether, under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, facts that authorize a sentence beyond the maximum
statutory sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in
front of a jury. 9 In this five to four decision, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court."
Apprendi pled guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm for
an unlawful purpose, a crime which carries a sentence of five to
ten years in prison.8 1 After the guilty plea was entered, the prosecutor in the case sought to enhance the sentence under the New
Jersey "hate crime" statute.8 2 After an evidentiary hearing, the
sentencing judge "found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a
12-year term on the firearms count. '
Apprendi argued that the hate crime statute created a separate
element to the offense, and must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and submitted to the jury." In defense of its hate crime enhancement statute, the State made three arguments.8 5 First, that
a finding of bias is a sentencing factor, not an element of a distinct
76. Id. at 248-49. The Court held that a prior conviction is distinct because it was
necessarily submitted before a jury to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at some earlier
time, and thus fulfilled the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id.
77. Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52.
78. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
79. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
80. Id. at 468. Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined in the majority. Id. at 466. Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote concurring opinions. Id. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Rehnquist, Kenndy and Breyer joined. Id. Justice Breyer filed a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Id.
81. Id. at 470.
82. Id. The New Jersey "hate crime" law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:44-3(e)(1984) "provides
for an 'extended term' of imprisonment if the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that '[tihe defendant in committing the crime acted with the purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation or enthicity.'" Id. at 468-69. The sentence for second-degree offenses
under the hate crime law is "between 10 and 20 years." Id. This statute has since been
deleted by amendment. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:44-3(e)(2001).
83. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466.
84. Id. at 471.
85. Id. at 492.
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offense. 6 Second, that under McMillan, sentencing factors can be
found by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 Finally,
that McMillan was extended by Almendarez to allow judges to
impose sentences beyond the statutory maximum.88
The Court found that the first argument by the State was a
plain disagreement of opinion.89 In its holding that the finding of
bias is an element of the offense, the Court stated that such a finding is the equivalent to a finding of intent or motive. 9° With regard to the State's second argument, the Court held that the mere
fact that the enhancement was placed within the sentencing provisions does not negate the fact that such a finding is an essential
element of the offense.91 Finally, in addressing the State's third
argument, the Court distinguished the finding from Almendarez
on the basis that the sentencing enhancement at issue in Alemendarez was based on recidivism, which "does not relate to the commission of the offense," whereas the bias factor "goes precisely to
what happened in the 'commission of the offense.'"" The Court
also distinguished the hate crime enhancement from capital offense cases where the judge has discretion as to whether or not
the death penalty will be imposed. s3 The Court found the distinction in the fact that all of the elements necessary to expose a defendant to the death penalty must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to the jury, and only then does the judge possess the discretion to impose the death penalty or a lesser penalty.94
The rule espoused by the Court in Apprendi is as follows, "other
than the fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."95
86. Id.
87. Id. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
88. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 492-93. The statute required a finding that at the time the offense was committed, the defendant possessed a "purpose to intimidate" on account of race. Id. at 492.
The Court found in significant part that "the defendant's intent in committing a crime is
perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense 'element.'" Id. at 493.
91. Id. at 495.
92. Id. at 496.
93. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 490. Put another way, "itis unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from
the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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In the recently decided case of Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme
Court of the United States was faced with whether an aggravating
factor must be found by a jury, or whether it may be submitted to
the judge as Arizona law specified." In a seven to two decision,
the Court simultaneously overruled its decision in Walton v. Arizona 97 and upheld its decision in Apprendi.9 s Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. 99
The State's first argument for the continuing viability of the
Arizona sentencing scheme was that Ring was convicted of a crime
for which the statutory punishment was either death or life imprisonment, therefore he was sentenced within the statutorily authorized range of sentences.' 0 The Court addressed this argument
with its finding that the conviction alone did not permit the death
penalty; the finding of an aggravating circumstance was what authorized the capital sentence.'0 '
The second argument asserted by the State was that the aggravating factors were mere sentencing factors, not elements of the
offense. 1°'
The Court disposed of this argument by relying upon
the general rule from Apprendi: If a factor elevates the maximum
authorized statutory sentence, it is an element, no matter how it
is labeled.0 3 Thus, the Court found that the mere fact that the
State labeled the aggravating factors as sentencing considerations
did not change the fact 0that
they were the functional equivalent of
4
elements of the offense.
The final argument posited by the State was that capital sentencing is an exception to the general rule from Apprendi. °5 The

96. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Ring was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death
after the judge in the case found aggravating factors based on testimony at sentencing.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 593-94.
97. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). Walton "ruled that aggravating factors were not 'elements of
the offense'; they were 'sentencing considerations' guiding the choice between life and
death." Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
98. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
99. Id. at 588. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined the majority opinion. Id. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Thomas joined.
Id. at 610. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 613. Justice Breyer filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Ring, 536 U.S. at 619.
100. Id. at 603-04.
101. Id. at 604.
102. Id. In making its argument, the State reiterated the distinction between an "offense element" and a "sentencing factor" from Walton. Id.
103. Ring, 536 U.S. at 605.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 605-06.
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Court efficiently disregarded this argument when it pointed out
that the State presented no concrete rationale for the exception,
and their allusion to the Eighth Amendment's constraints on capital sentencing had no basis in constitutional jurisprudence."' 6
In Ring, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled its
earlier decision in Walton, in which the Court allowed "a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." 7 The Court
decided Ring in this way because the aggravating factors in Arizona's capital sentencing scheme were "the functional equivalent
of an element of a greater offense," and thus required by the Sixth
Amendment to be found by a jury.08
The first case before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealing
with the broad issue of recidivist sentencing was Rauch v. Commonwealth.0 9 The issue in Rauch was whether a greater punishment for a second offense was valid when there was not a trial."0
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a prior conviction
must be stated in the indictment in order for an increased punishment to be so imposed.I'
In the 1981 case of Commonwealth v. Coleman, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania addressed whether prior convictions should
be considered an element of the offense of retail theft, and must
thus be introduced to the court.12 The court held in significant
part that "prior offenses do not constitute a substantive element to
be proved by the Commonwealth.. . such evidence shall be introduced to the court only, at the time of sentencing, and shall not be
introduced for purposes of trial.""'
The Commonwealth argued that the fact of prior convictions
was an element of the offense of retail theft, and should thus be
permitted to be presented to the jury at trial."' The court looked
to the text of the statute defining retail theft to determine whether
the fact of prior conviction was an element of the offense."' Be106.
107.
108.
109.
selling
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 606.
Id. at 609.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n.19 (2000)).
78 Pa. 490 (1875). The Rauch case involved a defendant who was convicted "for
spirituous, vinous and malt liquors." Rauch, 78 Pa. at 490.
Rauch, 78 Pa. at 490.
Id.
433 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super. 1981).
Coleman, 433 A.2d at 40.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
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cause the grading of the offense was separated from the elements
of the offense in a different subsection, the court found that the
legislature did not intend to include prior convictions in the elements of the offense."' In the rationale for its decision, the court
stressed that the fact of a prior conviction did not assist the trier
of fact in ascertaining any of the clearly delineated elements of the
crime of retail theft, and as such, the fact of prior convictions need
not be submitted before a jury."
In the recently decided case of Commonwealth v. Griffin, the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania decided whether a Pennsylvania
statute doubling the statutory maximum punishment upon the
sentencing court's finding of a prior conviction was a violation of
the state and federal constitutions."' The court held that there
was no basis for converting the fact of a prior conviction into an
element of the offense of possession with intent to deliver."9 Thus,
the court held, the government is not required to submit to the
jury for
a factual determination whether the defendant is a recidi120
vist.
Griffith argued that the statute was a sentencing enhancement,
in effect creating a new offense, and thus converting the fact of a
prior conviction into an element of that new offense. 2 ' The court
looked to the text of the statute itself and the case history to address this argument, concluding that the statute creates no new
offense, nor adds any new elements to the existing offense that
would22 be required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the
jury.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in Griffin, upheld the rule
in Apprendi, excepting prior convictions from the general requirement that all sentencing factors, which enhance a sentence
beyond the statutory
limits, must be proven beyond a reasonable
2
1
jury.
a
to
doubt
Aponte was simply the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's adoption of the rule from Apprendi. The recent decisions from the Su-

116. Id.
117. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Lark, 504 A.2d 1291 (Pa. Super. 1986).
118. 804 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2002). The statute at issue in the Griffin case is 35 P.S.
§780-115, the same statute challenged inAponte. Griffin, 804 A.2d at 7.
119. Griffin, 804 A.2d at 18.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 14.
122. Id. at 15-17.
123. Griffin, 804 A.2d at 18.
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preme Court of the United States in Blakely v. Washington'2 4 and
United States v. Booker"5 are, however, the next steps in the Ring,
Jones, and Apprendi line of cases regarding sentencing.
In Blakely, the court relied on the rule from Apprendi and held
unconstitutional a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum
after findings of fact were made by the judge."6 The court in
Blakely explicitly did not, however, address issues relating to the
mandatory nature of sentence enhancements.'2 7 The Blakely decision, by specifically mentioning that it would not apply its ruling
to the issue of mandatory sentencing, appears to have foreshadowed exactly that application in the court's decision in Booker.
The court in Booker applied the decision in Blakely as it relates
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'
Ultimately, the court held
that "the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely applies to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines," in effect making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory, rather than mandatory. 29
The decision from Booker will drastically change sentencing
procedure in this country, requiring that facts that enhance a sentence be submitted before a jury, not simply decided by the judge
at a sentencing hearing, with the exception of prior convictions.
Also, there will likely be many appeals brought where a sentence
was imposed under the formerly-mandatory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. The effects from Booker will certainly be felt in the
federal system, and will undoubtedly affect state sentencing law
as well.
The Aponte decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will
not be affected by the Booker decision. The court in Booker did,
however, reaffirm the validity of the prior conviction exception
when it quoted and applied the rule from Apprendi, including the
prior conviction exception." °
Sarah J. Cottrill
124. 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
125. 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
126. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2533. The authority for the extension of the sentence was
granted statutorily to the findings of the judge, separate from the proceedings and findings
of the jury. Id. In Blakely, the trial judge found that the Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. had
acted with deliberate cruelty (a "statutorily enumerated ground for departing from the
standard range"), and thus increased his sentence for kidnapping his wife above the statutory maximum. Id.
127. Id.
128. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 741.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 5.

